


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
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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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


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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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### DAILY BRIEF

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\*USSR: (The prominent Soviet journalist Yuri Zhukov has denied reports of possible recent Soviet nuclear testing.)

(Zhukov, who is often used as an unofficial spokesman for the Soviet leadership, told a US Embassy official on 1 July that the rumored explosions were "earthquakes, as announced by the Soviet press." He expressed the hope that the US Government now shared the view of "certain Western observers" that the risk of an "isolated" one-kiloton test is "nothing" compared to the danger of additional countries gaining a nuclear capability.)

(His remarks constitute the first Soviet acknowledgment of US press speculation about possible Soviet testing. They suggest that the Soviet leaders wish to prevent such speculation from having adverse repercussions on the upcoming three-power test-ban talks.)

(According to the embassy, Pravda on 20 June did report one rather strong earthquake in the Kurile Islands on 19 June.

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\*USSR: Moscow apparently intends to evade clarifying at this time whether Khrushchev's latest proposal for a partial nuclear test-ban agreement is contingent on Western acceptance of a NATO - Warsaw Pact nonaggression treaty.

Mikoyan and Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin, responding to Western press queries at the US Embassy reception in Moscow yesterday, seem deliberately to have avoided indicating what the Soviet position will be in the three-power test-ban talks scheduled to open in Moscow on 15 July.

In his 2 July speech in East Berlin, Khrushchev proposed "simultaneous" signing of a partial test-ban agreement and nonaggression treaty.

Mikoyan said yesterday Khrushchev had "directly" called for a "connection" between the two accords. Zorin, however, stated that the nonaggression treaty is not a condition for a test-ban agreement--but then said it is "part of the whole."

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\*USSR - Communist China: The exchange of broadsides between Moscow and Peiping just before the start of "unity" talks today marks an attempt by both sides to have the last word before the meetings force a temporary halt in public polemics.

A statement of the Soviet party central committee, frontpaged in yesterday's Pravda, charged that the Chinese Communist "leaders" do not desire a cessation of the polemics or a resolution of existing differences.

Peiping struck back almost immediately with a Chinese party central committee statement broadcast by the New China News Agency in which the Soviet accusations were disdainfully dismissed as "distortions" which would be dealt with by the Chinese delegation in Moscow.

Having parried the Soviet thrust, Peiping expressed the hope that the conference would speed preparations for a meeting of representatives from all Communist parties. Such a meeting is probably China's main objective at Moscow.

Neither antagonist expects the current talks to resolve Sino-Soviet differences, and the Chinese are anxious to move the dispute into a larger arena which would aid their drive for support in the world Communist movement. Moscow is certain to be reluctant to agree to such a meeting under present circumstances.

Both sides are also publicizing their last-minute exchange over the recent expulsion of five Chinese from the USSR. Peiping appears to have had the last word for the moment--late yesterday the Chinese broadcast the text of a protest note handed to the Soviet Embassy the same day. [REDACTED]

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Iraq-USSR: (The Iraqi regime's relations with the Soviet bloc are deteriorating sharply.)

(On 3 July the government suppressed a rising by some 300 Communist noncommissioned officers at an army camp outside Baghdad. The Communists attempted to seize the military prison at the camp and release a number of Communist leaders held there. The government claims to have evidence that Soviet instructors participated in the planning of the mutiny, and Baghdad radio has accused Moscow of "a plot against our national independence.")

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(In the past month, during which the USSR suspended military shipments to Iraq and further indicated support for the Kurdish rebels, Baghdad's propaganda has become more violent and specific in its attacks on the Soviet bloc. Iraqi television has shown films of the Hungarian uprising and of Khrushchev's antics at the UN, while the press has ridiculed the Soviet leader's "vulgarity" and "failures.")

(Following the line of Moscow's previous charges, Mongolia this week asked that an item charging Iraq with "genocide" against the Kurds be inscribed on the agenda of the next UN General Assembly. Iraq has broken relations with Mongolia as a result.)

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\*South Vietnam: (The religious issue continues to fester and more incidents are likely.)

(Reports persist that the Buddhist leaders are planning further self-sacrifices and demonstrations. In the meantime, they are keeping up pressure on the government by issuing statements expressing dissatisfaction with Saigon's failure fully to implement the agreement reached in mid-June. [redacted])

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(While government officials insist that they are taking steps to honor the agreement, they have so far done little to dispel Buddhist suspicions. President Diem has [redacted] stated that while the Buddhists' demands may be reasonable, concessions would only encourage further demands.)

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\*Argentina: Peronist leaders are again threatening to abstain from the 7 July elections, as Peron ordered, but dissension within their ranks is forcing further talks with the government.

Peronist leaders announced to the press that their National and Popular Front (FNP) would abstain after a reaffirmation of Peron's order was brought from Spain on 3 July. However, the four non-Peronist parties belonging to the FNP have not commented and may protest Peron's order for "revolutionary" abstention. Moreover, FNP leaders began talks with the government yesterday in what the US Embassy believes is an effort to negotiate some formula that will still permit the presidential candidacy of Vicente Solano Lima, who was chosen by Peron.

Peron's message coincided with a government decree banning the candidacy of ex-Peronist chief Matera, who was running on the slate of the small Christian Democratic Party (PDC). This prompted a PDC decision to run no candidates. The press has quoted both Matera and Solano Lima as stating that they would bring back Peron if elected--a statement which is not only illegal but antagonizes the majority of Argentines. Not even all of the Peronists, who polled 24 percent of the total vote in 1962, favor Peron.

The armed forces are maintaining comprehensive security precautions to prevent any effort to disrupt the elections.

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NOTES

Venezuela: The US Embassy reports that Caracas is in an uneasy mood and foresees the possibility of a period of turbulence surrounding Venezuela's Independence Day (5 July). There is some evidence that the Communists plan to carry out terrorist attacks against US officials and business firms in Caracas and western Venezuela at that time.

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\*Sweden-USSR: Sweden has canceled a good-will exchange between the Swedish and Soviet air forces later this year, presumably as a result of the Wennerstrom case. So far there has been no reaction from Moscow, where the proposal originated. The Swedes have indicated that they do not wish to appear openly hostile to the USSR at this time, and they have remained silent on the Khrushchev visit scheduled for next spring. Statements by various government spokesmen, however, have implied that the Swedes hope the visit can be postponed indefinitely.

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Yugoslavia-Vatican: Negotiations between Belgrade and the Vatican for the appointment of an apostolic delegate to Belgrade have apparently been under way in Rome since February. The Vatican is seeking greater freedom for the church in Yugoslavia to train priests and full freedom to conduct religious education for children, while Belgrade has asked assurances that the church will not engage in political activities. An Italian diplomat in Belgrade claims both sides seem anxious for at least a limited agreement.

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